Constructor Theory, proposed by David Deutsch and developed with Chiara Marletto, claims to offer a new foundation for physics. Rather than describing what does happen, it seeks to describe what could and could not happen: which transformations of the physical world are possible, which are impossible, and why.
On the surface, this might look like a radical break. But if we take a closer look at its metaphors, assumptions, and ontology, a more familiar pattern emerges: physics once again mistaking its own symbolic construals for the bedrock of reality.
1. The Central Metaphor: The “Constructor”
At the heart of the theory is the metaphor of a constructor — like a catalyst or a machine that enacts transformations repeatedly without degrading. But this is not an ontological primitive; it is a metaphor imported from technology and chemistry. By elevating this image to foundational status, Constructor Theory reifies a figure of speech, mistaking a convenient analogy for a universal category of being.
2. Reality as Tasks
Constructor Theory describes reality in terms of tasks: possible or impossible transformations. This is a computational and instrumentalist framing — the world as a ledger of operations. But “task” is already a perspectival cut: an observer’s way of marking input-output relations. To treat this as the true furniture of reality is to confuse an epistemic construal with an ontological foundation.
3. Absolutising Counterfactuals
For Deutsch and Marletto, counterfactuals are objective truths about the world: possibilities and impossibilities exist independently of perspective. This ignores the fact that possibility is always construed within a system — the cut between possible and impossible is not “out there” but made in the act of construal. Constructor Theory thus absolutises its own perspective, mistaking relational potential for law-like edict.
4. Information as Physics
Constructor Theory grounds “information” in which copying or distinguishing tasks are possible. This collapses meaning into physics. The symbolic and semiotic dimensions of information are erased, leaving only operational traces. By reducing the meaningful to the physical, the theory confuses the semiotic order with the order of physical affordances.
5. The Sharp Cut: Possible vs Impossible
Constructor Theory insists on a binary: every task is either possible or impossible. This imposition of a hard boundary erases gradience, emergence, and perspectival nuance. What is in fact a fluid horizon of potential is projected as a sharp ontological divide.
6. The Universal Ambition
Constructor Theory casts itself as a universal meta-framework for physics, a final explanatory layer. But this is a familiar move: the hubris of mistaking a local construal — physics framed through tasks and constructors — for the ultimate structure of reality.
7. Anthropocentric Smuggling
Finally, Constructor Theory draws its metaphors from human technological experience: machines, tasks, copying, constructors. These anthropocentric figures are smuggled into physics under the guise of neutrality, disguising a cultural projection as an ontological revelation.
Seeing the Frame
Constructor Theory is not a neutral foundation of physics but a telling case study in how physics frames itself. It elevates technological metaphors, absolutises counterfactual possibility, reduces meaning to information, and projects perspectival cuts as universal laws. Its ambition to be a universal theory is itself a symptom of its blindness to construal: mistaking the symbolic scaffolding of its own discourse for the architecture of reality itself.
In this sense, Constructor Theory is less a breakthrough and more a mirror: a window into the hidden architecture of physics, showing once again how much of its foundation rests not on nature, but on metaphor.
Notes:
1. The Central Metaphor: Constructor
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CT move: Imports the metaphor of the constructor (like a catalyst, or a machine that builds without degrading). This image is supposed to anchor the theory.
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Problem: It reifies a metaphor. A “constructor” is just a way of picturing repeatability. By elevating it to an ontological primitive, CT mistakes a familiar technological image for a fundamental category of reality.
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Fallacy: Reification through metaphor — turning a metaphorical abstraction into the bedrock of ontology.
2. The Task Ontology: Reality as Transformation
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CT move: Claims that reality can be fundamentally described in terms of possible/impossible tasks.
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Problem: This smuggles in a strongly computational and instrumentalist worldview — as if reality itself were a ledger of operations. But “task” is already a perspectival construal (an observer marking an input-output relation). To treat it as ontological is to absolutise an epistemic cut.
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Fallacy: Category mistake — mistaking an observer-relative construal for an observer-independent ontology.
3. Counterfactual Absolutisation
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CT move: Elevates counterfactuals (what could or could not happen) to the status of fundamental reality.
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Problem: Possibility in CT is conceived as objective, mind-independent, law-given. This ignores that the possible/impossible distinction is always perspectival — a cut made in the potential of a system. By erasing construal, CT absolutises its own perspective.
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Fallacy: Absolutisation of possibility — treating systemic potential as if it existed unconstrued.
4. Information as Physics
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CT move: Grounds information in which copying/distinguishing tasks are possible.
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Problem: This collapses meaning into physics. “Information” here is a purely operational category, stripped of its symbolic dimension. CT thus confuses the value dimension (copying, distinguishing) with the semiotic dimension (meaning).
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Fallacy: Reductionism — collapsing symbolic into physical by redefining it in operational terms.
5. The Sharp Cut: Possible vs Impossible
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CT move: For any task, it is either possible or impossible.
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Problem: This imposes a binary cut onto systemic potential, ignoring gradience, emergence, and perspectival nuance. It naturalises the cut as if it were “out there,” when in fact it is a feature of construal.
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Fallacy: False dichotomy — projecting perspectival distinctions as absolute ontological divides.
6. Universal Ambition
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CT move: Positions itself as a universal meta-framework for physics.
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Problem: This is a familiar hubris — mistaking a local construal (physics through tasks and constructors) for a universal ontology. In relational terms, CT is just one more system of meaning, reflexively construing itself as ultimate.
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Fallacy: Ontological imperialism — confusing the scope of a construal with the structure of reality itself.
7. Hidden Anthropocentrism
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CT move: Talks of “tasks,” “constructors,” “machines,” “copying,” etc.
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Problem: These are all drawn from human technological experience. They smuggle anthropocentric metaphors into the foundations of physics while pretending to be neutral.
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Fallacy: Metaphorical anthropomorphism — hiding human categories inside universal claims.
Synthesis
Constructor Theory is not just speculative physics; it is a metaphorical construal elevated into ontology. Its central images (constructor, task, counterfactual) are not universal categories of being but human-symbolic ways of cutting systemic potential. By ignoring the role of construal, CT falls into reification, absolutisation, and reductionism.
From a relational-ontological standpoint, CT is itself a phenomenon: a reflexive construal of reality through computational and Popperian lenses. Its value lies in showing how physics, once again, reaches for possibility as fundamental — but then misrecognises possibility as given, rather than construed.
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