Time Out of Joint: Rereading Quantum Gravity through Relational Ontology

The latest Nature commentary on the search for quantum gravity (here) presents the familiar paradoxes with renewed metaphors. The article insists that reconciling general relativity and quantum mechanics requires a better understanding of time, yet its own conceptual scaffolding guarantees confusion. Six themes stand out:

1. The spatialisation of mathematics

The text repeatedly treats Hilbert space as if it were a location — a place where transitions “occur.” This is not a neutral description but a reification: the representational space of possible states becomes an ontological container. From a relational perspective, Hilbert space is not a “where” but a system of potential, a theory of instances. To spatialise it is to misread the system as phenomenon.

2. Synchronisation as metaphor and mystification

The analogy of a singer keeping in time with a hidden recording suggests that “time” runs in two independent flows — one in mathematics, one in physics — that must somehow remain perfectly synchronised. This is a contrived problem. The apparent synchrony is simply a perspectival alignment within the theory itself. To posit two clocks and then marvel at their coordination is to invent a paradox and then marvel at its solution.

3. Fabric and stage/actor metaphors for spacetime

Relativity is described as upgrading spacetime from stage to actor, from passive background to dynamic fabric. These metaphors import material and theatrical substance into what is a relational construal. Space-time is not woven cloth, nor an agent strutting on stage, but a structured systemic model of potential relations. The metaphors obscure this, making it appear as though the model itself were the material.

4. Absolutising representation as ontology

The claim that “nothing is external to spacetime” follows from the representation, not from reality. To insist on the absolute exclusivity of spacetime is to mistake the horizon of a model for the horizon of being. Relational ontology insists otherwise: every construal is perspectival, and no model totalises meaning.

5. Events as substance rather than cut

The article construes events as things that “happen in spacetime” — already given, already located. In relational terms, events are not substances but perspectival cuts: instances actualised against systemic potential. A “history” is not a pre-existing path but a structured construal of potential trajectories. To mistake them for realities is to confuse theory with phenomenon.

6. Probability as hidden strangeness

The sum-over-histories approach is celebrated for eliminating Copenhagen’s duality, only for its “strangeness” to be relocated, like a ruck in a carpet, into the peculiarities of probability. Yet the problem arises only because probabilities are misread as properties of events rather than reflexive weightings of construal. There is no “where” the strangeness hides; there is only reflexivity in the alignment of systemic potentials.

Taken together, these themes show not that time is broken, but that the conceptual metaphors themselves are misaligned. What needs rethinking is not time, but the reifications that sustain its paradoxes.

The Irreconcilability Illusion

Norma Sanchez asks whether general relativity and quantum physics are “irreconcilable.” It is a familiar refrain: two “grand theories,” one cosmic, one atomic, each elegant in isolation but mutually unintelligible. The myth here is not simply about their incompatibility — it is about the assumption that there must be a single, unified theory of reality that resolves all contradictions.

From a relational ontology perspective, this “irreconcilability” dissolves once we expose the construal at work. Both relativity and quantum mechanics are systems of theoretical potential — structured ways of construing physical phenomena. Relativity construes experience of massive bodies and curved spacetime; quantum mechanics construes phenomena of atomic and subatomic interaction. Each system is internally coherent, but coherence does not entail universal reach. To insist that the two must “fit together” is already to mistake theories for a pre-given reality they are supposed to represent.

Sanchez rightly notes that the problem arises when relativity is pushed below its construal horizon: the notion of “point particles” generates infinities that “make no sense.” But this is not a signal of failure. It is the mark of systemic cut-off: the limits of the potential that relativity theorises. Similarly, quantum mechanics, when extended upward to the cosmic scale, strains its own logic.

Attempts at reconciliation — string theory, quantised gravity, quantum spacetime — all presume that meaning is missing, waiting to be completed by some meta-framework. Relational ontology instead reframes the situation: the problem is not a broken reality needing a fix, but our demand for a single master construal. Reality is not “in pieces” to be glued together; it is always already construed through perspectives that are mutually delimiting.

In Sanchez’s hope that “the two frameworks can be united” through new observations, we hear the persistence of the myth: the belief that “more data” will force nature to speak in a single tongue. But data, too, are construed; observation never escapes the cut of theory. What new experiments will do is open fresh horizons of construal — new ways of coordinating, phasing, and aligning meaning at different scales.

Thus, the real task is not reconciliation, but recognition: physics is not fractured, it is perspectival. Relativity and quantum mechanics are not enemies awaiting a truce, but parallel cuts in the fabric of possibility. Their so-called “irreconcilability” is a symptom of the myth of the one true theory, a myth worth leaving behind.