Monday, 27 October 2025

Quantum Weirdness

Few tropes in popular science are as persistent as the idea that quantum physics is “weird.” Journalists revel in it, popularisers perform it, and even physicists themselves sometimes lean on the term when confronted with the difficulty of explaining their subject. But this reliance on weirdness as a descriptor does more than colour public perception — it installs a particular metaphysical bias at the heart of how we talk about quantum theory.

To call something “weird” presupposes a baseline of “normal.” That baseline, of course, is classical physics: the world of solid objects, continuous motion, and causal chains. By casting classical physics as the natural frame and quantum physics as its strange deviation, the discourse treats the former as ontological truth and the latter as an inexplicable anomaly.

Relationally, however, both classical and quantum construals are symbolic architectures. They are systems of meaning that carve possibility space in different ways. The so-called “weirdness” of quantum mechanics only arises if one assumes that the classical construal is reality itself, rather than one symbolic account among others. In this sense, weirdness is not a property of quantum phenomena at all — it is an artefact of the comparative framing.

The effect of the weirdness trope is thus to mystify. It distracts from the fact that what is at stake is not a clash between normality and deviation, but between two symbolic architectures of reality, each structuring relational potential in distinct ways. To insist that quantum mechanics is “weird” is to misrecognise the nature of both — to naturalise one and exoticise the other, while ignoring that both are reflexive construals.

Quantum mechanics does not demand that we resign ourselves to paradox or accept that “reality is just strange.” It demands that we interrogate how construal itself generates phenomena, and how symbolic architectures shape the horizons of the possible. The problem is not quantum weirdness, but the epistemological comfort of pretending that classical physics was ever “normal” in the first place.

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